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 Christina Rossetti’s Goblin Market is full of lists, but these lists come in two 
distinct varieties.  The first type, associated with the goblin men, is a list of objects: either 
of fruit (“Apples and quinces, / Lemons and oranges, / Plump unpecked cherries,” and so 
on) or of the goblins themselves.  The other type of list consists of similes: five times in 
the poem, either Lizzie or Laura or both together are described by a rapid string of 
similes (“Like two blossoms on one stem, / Like two flakes of new-fall’n snow, / Like 
two wands of ivory…”).1  Both devices are notable, but the latter is more striking, 
because a list or catalogue of similes is overtly self-defeating. 
 Any poetic list is to some extent self-defeating.  The list of fruits that begins 
Goblin Market – sixteen fruits in ten lines (5-14), some with accompanying epithets – 
provides too much sensory information in quick succession for a reader to be able to 
picture clearly the individual species.  After a certain number, each additional fruit adds 
to the impression of profusion, but does not actually conjure up a specific image: “Crab-
apples, dewberries, / Pine-apples, blackberries, / Apricots, strawberries,” coming at the 
end of the catalogue, are not only indistinct in themselves, but even begin to crowd out 
the apples and quinces with which the list began.  Such a list, then, is asymptotic: the first 
elements suggest a visual image, but each additional element adds less and less, until at a 
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certain point the list could be extended indefinitely without making any noticeable 
difference to the cumulative picture that has been painted. 
 The list or catalogue, after all, is typically thought of as the most unpoetic of all 
rhetorical forms; what more banal than a laundry list or a phone book?2  In A Defence of 
Poetry Percy Shelley specifically distinguishes between poetry and its opposite, “a 
catalogue of detached facts.”3  Moreover, a list like the one that begins Goblin Market 
reveals one of the limitations of poetry: the difficulty of depicting simultaneity.  Rossetti 
presents in temporal succession (since poetry unrolls in time) fruits that are meant to be 
pictured as coexisting.  What would be simple for a still-life painter is almost impossible 
for a poet, and the poetic list, blurrily rapid but never instantaneous, necessarily reminds 
the reader of this disadvantage (Ulmer, “Sky-Lark,” 250; Gass, 34).  Yet if a list of things 
carries these limitations, a list of similes is still more paradoxical – not just asymptotic, 
but essentially self-destructive.  A simile aims to illustrate, to provide an insight into one 
or both elements of which it consists; but the first set of similes in “Goblin Market” does 
not give us a clearer impression of Laura: 
 Laura stretched her gleaming neck 
 Like a rush-imbedded swan, 
 Like a lily from the beck, 
 Like a moonlit poplar branch, 
 Like a vessel at the launch 
 When its last restraint is gone. 
(81-6) 
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Some commentators have commended the clarity of these lists,4 but I find it impossible to 
imagine someone who is simultaneously like a swan and a lily and a branch and a boat.  
(Although a simile does not necessarily require the reader to picture its elements 
distinctly, it does ask us to imagine their physical resemblance at some level.)  The effect 
of this passage in context, where it is read rapidly – especially as it follows the earlier, 
material lists, which demand to be read trippingly – is self-defeating.  The metaphors, as 
Katherine Mayberry writes, “serve, not as an enriching descriptive method, but as a 
desperate and hopeless means for defining an essence that is not known” (Mayberry, 99).  
Each new simile not only fails to add to the previous one, but drives it away, so that 
Laura, far from becoming clearer to the reader through this series of descriptions, is 
actually drowned in a surfeit of superimposed images.  This failure is purposeful: Laura 
seems to be asserting her individuality at this moment by doing what her sister does not 
dare; but in fact she is on the brink of losing herself, of becoming indistinguishable from 
her desires. 
A list of similes, then, is paradoxical: it yokes together the most unpoetic of tropes 
with the most poetic – since the language of poets, in Shelley’s definition, “is vitally 
metaphorical” (Defence, SPP 512).  This conjunction recurs throughout Rossetti’s work – 
she lists similes not only in Goblin Market but in “A Birthday,” briefly in “The Prince’s 
Progress” (the title poem of her second collection), and again in half a dozen less well-
known poems throughout her career.  Rossetti has several forerunners in the use of this 
device, Petrarch being the one who comes most immediately to mind.  It is no accident 
that the first girl in Goblin Market to be blazoned in a rush of metaphors and to be 
rendered powerless by the merchant-men is named “Laura.”  The compiling of similes is 
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a feature of the Petrarchan sonnet tradition, a tradition with which Rossetti was 
particularly familiar – she even claimed descent from Petrarch’s Laura (Marsh, 212).  
The name “Lizzie,” too, though its significance is more debatable, seems to point toward 
the Petrarchan tradition: as Catherine Maxwell points out, Lizzie bears a notable 
resemblance to Elizabeth Barrett Browning (Maxwell, 79, 92).  Like her namesake in 
Rossetti’s poem, Barrett Browning in Sonnets from the Portuguese counters the 
masculine tradition by seeming to participate in it, thus helping to redeem “Laura” from 
her position of constraint.  Goblin Market appears to be the first installment in Rossetti’s 
long poetic conversation with Petrarch. 
 Yet Rossetti’s lists of similes differ notably from Petrarch’s.  It is possible, 
without contradiction, to string together a list of comparisons in which tenor and vehicle 
both change.  The locus classicus for such a list is the Song of Songs (“Thy teeth are like 
a flock of sheep, thy lips are like a thread of scarlet, thy temples are like a piece of 
pomegranate”), which is then imitated in the blazons of Petrarchan sonneteers.  Such a 
string of similes presents few complications.  But the situation is entirely different when a 
single tenor is given a number of different vehicles.  In the lines from Goblin Market 
describing Laura, the four diverse comparisons all apply to one subject.  Here lies the 
great difference from the strings of similes in Petrarch: whereas the traditional sonnet-
blazon suggests richness, each additional simile for Laura is impoverishing.  The repeated 
attempts to fasten onto an appropriate vehicle, as Mayberry writes, “suggest uncertainty 
and incompletion” (99).  The poet, rather than showing off the resources of her 
imagination, seems to be admitting her own incapacity to discover a single sufficient 
likeness. 
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In this sense, Rossetti’s lists are closer to Percy Shelley’s than to Petrarch’s.  
Shelley, like Rossetti, repeatedly listed similes, most notably in Epipsychidion and “To a 
Sky-Lark,” but also in numerous other works, including “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 
The Witch of Atlas, and Swellfoot the Tyrant.  Behind Shelley lies the example of Milton.  
Lists and similes are both archetypal epic devices; Milton not only was the epic poet 
closest to Shelley and Rossetti, but he also combined the two devices in a way his 
classical precursors did not.  In what follows, I begin by considering lists of similes in 
general, arguing that their tendency is to test or strain the reader’s faith.  I then examine 
the very different effects of this tendency in Milton and Shelley before returning to 
Rossetti, for whom the trope represents in some ways a matter of life and death. 
 
 Much has been written about simile, and its parent trope, metaphor.5  The aspect 
of metaphor most relevant to the present discussion, because it comes out most strongly 
when metaphors or similes are strung together, is the one succinctly described by 
Coleridge: “No simile runs on all four legs” (Coleridge, 86).  In other words, any 
metaphor implies both similitude and difference: a perfectly four-legged simile would be 
a tautology.  (On the other hand, a metaphor without a leg to stand on, in which there is 
no obvious similarity between the two elements, is more accurately called metonymy.)  A 
simile is necessarily imperfect and requires, to use another Coleridgean tag, a suspension 
of disbelief.  It would be perfectly rational, to any poetic assertion that “A is like B,” for 
the reader to respond, “No, they are different.”  A poetic simile, then, implies an act of 
faith: the reader puts his or her faith in the poet by willingly suspending disbelief, on the 
assumption that the poet is constructing the simile in good faith.  This relationship is 
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analogous to the simile that gave rise to it, in which A and B are wedded to each other, 
temporarily agreeing to ignore their differences. 
 A list, by contrast, is an act of non-faith.  I make a shopping list because I do not 
trust myself to remember all of the things I need to buy.  The poetic list likewise 
delegates minimal responsibility to the reader; the originary Catalogue of Ships in Book 2 
of the Iliad, for instance, is both comprehensive and immediately comprehensible.  The 
same cannot be said, it is true, of all subsequent poetic lists: those of Walt Whitman, the 
most inveterate lister in English poetry, are rarely exhaustive, and so demand some act of 
imagination from the reader.  When Whitman names twenty persons, places, or things, he 
usually expects the reader to imagine the whole population of America, or the whole 
world; his lists, then, are synecdochic (Buell, 174; Goodblatt, 46).  But even here, lists 
provide an easing into synecdoche: most of the work of imagining vastness is not 
entrusted to the reader, but performed by Whitman himself.  A long list may test our 
patience, perhaps, but not our credulity, since everything is above-board. 
 When these two contradictory devices are combined, the result is to stretch the 
reader’s faith to its bursting-point, as happens in Goblin Market.  No firm rule exists for 
when such a catalogue of similes becomes self-defeating.  Two in a row does not present 
too great a difficulty: one of the the first epic similes in Homer is actually a double simile 
(Iliad 2.144-9), and the practice remained standard in later epic poetry.  Perhaps because 
the double simile is so established, however, we do not always realize just how 
challenging it is: when Homer compares the men at Agamemnon’s assembly both to the 
ocean and to a wheat-field, the figure is as complex as the well-known trick drawing of 
the rabbit and the duck.  Still, although it may not be possible to see both duck and rabbit 
Gray 7 
simultaneously, the mind is capable of recognizing that they coexist in the same figure.6  
Three vehicles, on the other hand, already pushes the limit and calls the speaker’s faith 
into question, as in Hamlet: 
Hamlet:  Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in the shape of a camel? 
Polonius:  By th’ mass, and it’s like a camel indeed. 
Hamlet:  Methinks it is like a weasel. 
Polonius:  It is backed like a weasel. 
Hamlet:  Or like a whale? 
Polonius:  Very like a whale.7 
Polonius’s “very” is usually delivered, and I think ought to be, with obvious irony.  
Polonius may be a courtier and willing to take on faith much of what a prince tells him, 
but the whale is the straw that breaks the camel’s back. 
 Yet even three successive similes are not always self-thwarting.  It is possible to 
conceive of one person being like three people, and although this is a mystery, it is not 
necessarily a contradiction.  In Christina Rossetti’s “Martyr’s Song” a shape appears “As 
a King … As a Priest … As the Lamb,” without stretching the reader’s faith in any 
extraordinary way (29-33).  Likewise, since in the traditional litany of the Virgin, Mary is 
compared to a whole array of symbols (tower of ivory, house of gold), Rossetti is on safe 
ground listing likenesses in “Whereto shall we liken this Blessed Mary Virgin”; her list 
could go on and on without peril.8  But in this case the similes (lily, rose, flower of 
women) already border on metonyms or symbols; the same is true of comparable lists in 
other religious poems, such as George Herbert’s “Prayer (I).”  In a secular setting, on the 
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other hand, and when the reader is actually required to discover the points of similarity, 
three or four consecutive comparisons for a single tenor suffice to test our credulity. 
 
 Homer’s catalogue of ships, from which subsequent epic catalogues derive, really 
is what it purports to be.  It straightforwardly lists real places, if not real people, so that 
“in post-Homeric Greece … appeals to it were made over disputed territories” (Bowra, 
71), and it remains of interest to archaeologists as well as to literary critics (e.g. Simpson 
and Lazenby).  Later lists are less straightforward: the next catalogue in Homer, which 
follows immediately, lists Trojan warriors, and this tradition of naming the enemy is 
taken up by Virgil in Book VII of the Aeneid, which catalogues the cohort of Turnus 
(Boyd, 214).9  By the time of Milton the poetic list carries with it an air of suspicion.  
Spenser’s catalogue of trees in Book I of the Faerie Queene, for instance, is clearly 
ominous, even before it concludes with the deceptive “Maple seeldom inward sound” 
(FQ I, i, 9).  (Although Spenser’s sylvan list derives from a different classical tradition 
[Barton, 178-81], it too is a precursor for Milton’s epic catalogue, which names devils 
who are first presented to us as fallen leaves in a forest.)   But ominous or not, all these 
pre-Miltonic catalogues, in common with lists from the phone book to Walt Whitman, 
promise or at least gesture towards full disclosure.  The Latin troops around Turnus may 
be fighting against the foundation of Rome, but their names were familiar to Virgil’s 
audience.  There is no suggestion that they do not really exist, and the same holds true of 
Spenser’s trees. 
 Milton’s catalogue of devils in Book I of Paradise Lost (376-521), however, is 
not merely more suspicious but essentially different from its precursors.  All other epic 
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catalogues give a list of proper names; Milton gives a list of improper names.  “Say, 
Muse, thir Names” is an ironic invocation, since we have just been informed that their 
real names in heaven are “blotted out and ras’d,” that they have not “yet … Got them new 
Names” of pagan deities, and that even when they do they will assume “various Names” 
(376; 362; 364-5; 374).10  Each name on the list is no more than an approximation; if this 
were a phone book, it would be an infinitely frustrating one.  “Next Chemos,” we are told 
with apparent precision, only to learn his alias’s alias: “Peor his other Name” (407, 413).  
The good faith disclosure that characterizes Homer’s list is absent here, not because the 
items listed are evil, but because they cannot be accurately itemized and so demand an act 
of readerly faith. 
 The devils are of unspecifiable shape as well as name: some have merely “general 
Names / Of Baalim and Ashtaroth, those male, / These Feminine.  For Spirits when they 
please / Can either Sex assume, or both” (421-4).  Others are not bi-gendered but bi-
formed, partly zoomorphic, “[l]ike Comus’s crew” (Rosenblatt, 560).11  Since “when they 
please” – or, to use a more common Miltonic phrase, when they list – spirits can assume 
different forms and names, the catalogue is no more than a list of assumptions.  Or rather, 
a list of metaphors – partial likenesses, names and shapes forcibly yoked together.  Anne 
Ferry comments on the language shared by Milton’s catalogue and his similes: the list of 
demonic names is “sensuous, allusive, and particular,” and “By these allusions the 
catalogue repeats the language of the narrator’s similes and becomes itself a kind of 
super-extended simile contrasting our fragmented mortal world with the world of 
prehistory” (Ferry, 82, 84).  Barbara Everett also remarks on the allusive language shared 
by the catalogue and the similes, but she disagrees about the “particularity” of the 
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Miltonic list.  “A name’s virtue is its specificity,” but “Milton’s use of names continually 
converts the denotative into the connotative” (Everett, 262-3).  Everett refers here not just 
to the demonic list, with its “general Names / Of Baalim and Ashtaroth,” but to the 
subsequent roll-calls of great names as well.  All the lists in Paradise Lost are devalued 
or called into doubt by the failure of this original list to name anything precisely. 
 If Milton’s imprecise lists make demands upon the reader we would usually 
associate with simile, it is even more noticeable that his similes take the form of lists.  
The classical epic simile develops a single comparison with extreme detail, and Paradise 
Lost provides examples of this type too: the bee simile that concludes Book I, for instance 
(768-775).  But more commonly Milton will rattle off alternatives for comparisons he 
draws, beginning with the first simile in the poem: “as huge / As whom the Fables name 
of monstrous size, / Titanian, or Earth-born, that warr’d on Jove, / Briareos or Typhon, 
… or that Sea-beast / Leviathan” (1.196-201).  The comparison of Satan to Leviathan, the 
whale who can be mistaken for an island, has been held to prepare the reader for the 
deceptiveness both of Satan and of the poet’s method (Fish, 36).  But before we reach 
Leviathan, the final and most fully elaborated vehicle, we are offered several other 
possibilities, so that this simile appears less deceptive than simply uncertain.  The 
different italicized words could be synonyms or alternatives; it is not clear whether each 
new one is meant to be more exact than the last, or merely equivalent.  This listing of 
possible vehicles continues in later similes, becoming practically a rhetorical tic.  In 
contrast to the fully-developed double similes of Homer and Virgil (soldiers like ocean-
waves and also like wheat), Milton produces a stutter of alternatives, as if in self-
correction.  Satan looks like the sun shining either from behind clouds “or from behind 
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the Moon” (1.596); the devils resemble either “Forrest Oaks, or Mountain Pines” (1.613); 
they work like pioneers going “to trench a Field, / Or cast a Rampart” (1.677-8). 
 The examples could go on.  The characteristic specificity of the epic simile turns 
out to be specious, since another specification will do as well: the landscape of hell looks 
like “Pelorus, or … Aetna” (1.232-3).  Often there are more than just two alternatives: 
especially in the Satanic books of the poem, most comparisons trigger, not quite an epic 
catalogue, but an epi-catalogue.  This holds true even when the comparison does not take 
the form of an explicit simile.  Satan’s legions, for instance, call to mind a list of all those 
that could not compare with them – Giants, Thebans, knights of the Round Table, and so 
on (1.576-84); like the catalogue of devils immediately preceding it, this is a list of partial 
likenesses, failed metaphors.  The same impulse continues with the implied comparison 
that begins Book II, which forms another mini-catalogue: 
High on a Throne of Royal State, which far 
Outshon the wealth of Ormus and of Ind, 
Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand 
Showrs on her Kings Barbaric Pearl and Gold…. 
(2.1-4) 
Milton here repeats the aural effect he deployed in the invocation to Book I, the 
reiteration of the syllable “or” (Ormus, gorgeous), while he ticks off alternative 
comparisons for Satan’s state.12  He uses the same phonetic reinforcement later in the 
same book, when Satan is working his way through Chaos. 
 [B]ehoves him now both Oare and Saile. 
As when a Gryfon through the Wilderness 
Gray 12 
With winged course ore Hill or moarie Dale, 
Pursues the Arimaspian … 
  … So eagerly the fiend 
Ore bog or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or rare, 
With head, hands, wings or feet pursues his way, 
And swims or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flyes. 
(2.942-50) 
No simile goes on all four legs, but Milton’s are striking in that they swim or sink or 
wade or creep or fly.  He seems to be conspicuously groping for an appropriate vehicle to 
carry him through the boggy comparison he has entered.  Rather than encourage the 
reader to perform an act of faith in accepting that A is like B, Milton discourages us, 
since A is like B or C – hill or moory dale, Olympia or Pythia (2.530), Ganges or 
Hydaspes (3.436), Teneriffe or Atlas (4.987).  The alternatives rarely differ much, but 
they are all the more striking for being so apparently unnecessary.  The habit of listing 
different possibilities dissuades the reader from wholeheartedly participating in the usual 
contract of metaphor. 
 The effect of the conflation of the two epic devices is to undermine them both.  
On these occasions, Milton does not merely ironize the classical use of simile, as some 
have suggested that he regularly does (Widmer, 122; Martindale, 9), but entirely 
uncouples the two halves of the comparison he is apparently drawing together.  This 
occurs most explicitly in the series of metaphors in Book IX, when Eve leaves Adam. 
Thus saying, from her Husbands hand her hand 
Soft she withdrew, and like a Wood-Nymph light 
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Oread or Dryad, or of Delia’s Traine, 
Betook her to the Groves, but Delia’s self 
In gate surpass’d and Goddess-like deport …. 
To Pales, or Pomona thus adornd 
Likest she seemd, Pomona when she fled 
Vertumnus, or to Ceres in her Prime, 
Yet Virgin of Proserpina from Jove. 
(9.385-396) 
Again we find the multiple vehicles, and the multiple “ors” (Oread, deport, adornd).  
“Likest,” which in some editions appears as “Likeliest,” is one of the unlikeliest words 
for an epic simile, outside of Milton.  Far from being an assertion of similarity, it 
confesses the insufficiency of the first four comparisons, and despite its superlative form, 
it is not the last but is followed (superseded?) by the comparison to Ceres in the following 
line.  Each new vehicle does not seem to approach Eve, but softly to withdraw from her. 
 Milton yokes the two tropes of list and simile together with unprecedented 
regularity, and the effect is to turn every reader into Polonius.  We must decide how far 
we are willing to put our faith in any given simile-list before “like a whale” breaks the 
contract.  It could be argued that every metaphor in Paradise Lost is a deceptive whale, as 
in Stanley Fish’s reading.13  But in fact there seems to be nothing inherently evil about 
similes in Milton, even though most similes occur in proximity to Hell and Satan.  
Approximate likeness or similitude is the defining characteristic not just of Hell but of all 
creation: “Let us make now Man in our image, Man / In our similitude,” declares God 
(7.519-20).  Later God commends Adam for pursuing a desire for something similar to 
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himself, creating Eve as “Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, / Thy wish exactly to 
thy hearts desire” (8.450-51).  The search for a likeness is inherently human and 
commendable, and although any simile may deceive the reader, the trope becomes 
necessarily suspicious only when it is associated with lists.  And the inverse holds equally 
true: Milton’s epic catalogue challenges the reader’s faith not because it is associated 
with Satan, but because it is associated with similes. 
 Similitude remains innocent and worth pursuing if it is in the likeness of God.  
Eve is said to be a “likeness” of Adam, but he is God’s “similitude,” so that she too is 
vehicle of the divine image – unlike Adam’s other companions, the beasts, in which he 
had vainly looked for a likeness, since God’s “Image [is] not imparted to the Brute” 
(8.441).  Similes become suspect, however, when they obscure the divine image.  
Godlikeness is difficult to efface, but not impossible.  Adam in Book XI is shown the 
bodies of his fallen offspring ravaged by disease: 
Disfiguring not Gods likeness, but thir own, 
Or if his likeness, by themselves defac’t 
While they pervert pure Natures healthful rules 
To loathsom sickness, worthily, since they 
Gods Image did not reverence in themselves. 
(11.521-25) 
Not every sin or excess disfigures God’s image, but according to Michael there comes a 
point where the divine tenor is indeed defaced in its likeness.  The same is true of 
metaphor – not evil in itself (though fallible), it becomes perverted when it metastasizes, 
when it obscures its tenor rather than illuminating it, as happens in a list.  Milton’s 
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conjunction of the tropes of catalogue and simile trains the reader both to extend his or 
her faith, and also, when necessary, to withdraw it. 
 
 Whereas in Milton the listing of metaphors is an exception, a test, in the writings 
of Percy Shelley it is absolutely central to poetic endeavor.  Shelley employs the device 
in brief personal lyrics (“To Sophia,” “Remembrance”) and in political squibs (“Similes 
for two Political Characters of 1819”).  It appears in his major odes, such as “Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty”: 
Like moonbeams that behind some piny mountain shower,… 
Like hues and harmonies of evening,— 
   Like clouds in starlight widely spread,— 
   Like memory of music fled,— 
   Like aught that for its grace may be 
Dear, and yet dearer for its mystery. 
(5, 8-12) 
Here the device suggests an overflow of inspiration, yet it remains suspect even when 
used with the most apparent self-confidence.  In “To a Sky-Lark,” for instance, Shelley 
offers at least one comparison for the bird in each of stanzas 2 to 14, including a series of 
stanzas beginning with “Like” and each consisting of a single extended simile: like a 
poet, a maiden, a glow-worm, a rose.  But in this anaphoric series (lines 36-55), “the 
similes finally and crucially do not fit.  Rather they confirm [the speaker’s] patent 
inability to discover appropriate analogues for the skylark in nature.  His ‘Like’ remains 
futile and the lark elusive” (Ulmer, “Sky-Lark,” 252).  Shelley is clearly aware of the 
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problematic nature of such a list, as he shows in his ironic use of the device in the 
satirical Swellfoot the Tyrant, where the wizard Purganax proposes turning the pig-queen 
into an angel: 
   Second Boar.  How glorious it will be to see her Majesty 
Flying above our heads, her petticoats 
Streaming like – like – like – 
   Third Boar.   Anything. 
   Purganax.    Oh no! 
But like a standard of an admiral’s ship, 
Or like the banner of a conquering host, 
Or like a cloud dyed in the dying day, 
Unravelled on the blast from a white mountain; 
Or like a meteor, or a war-steed’s mane, 
Or waterfall from a dizzy precipice 
Scattered upon the wind. 
   First Boar.  Or a cow’s tail. 
   Second Boar.  Or anything, as the learned Boar observed. 
(2.1.95-105; Shelley, Poetical Works, 403) 
The list here is like that in Hamlet: the more shapes one finds in the cloud, the less one 
trusts the likeness, or the speaker. 
 Yet while Shelley recognizes that to compile a list of similitudes is self-
perplexing, he nevertheless considers such effort to be necessary.  The vain and perpetual 
search for an ideal likeness is the common endeavor of love and of poetry.  Hence it is 
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nothing short of fundamental, as Shelley suggests in his essay “On Love,” with its 
reminiscence of Milton’s Adam: “We are born into the world and there is something 
within us which from the instant that we live and move thirsts after its likeness” (SPP 
504).  But a perfect “likeness” is unattainable; hence great souls will reach perpetually 
after an approximation.  As Shelley says in “A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancient 
Greeks Relative to the Subject of Love,” “This object [of love] or its archetype forever 
exists in the mind which selects among those who resemble it that which most resembles 
it and instinctively fills up the interstices of the imperfect image in the same manner as 
the imagination moulds and completes the shapes in clouds, or in the fire, into the 
resemblance of whatever form, animal, building, &c., happens to be present to it” 
(Shelley, Prose, 220).  Like Hamlet looking at the clouds, love is compelled to find not a 
true likeness, but a series of imperfect likenesses.  As Shelley wrote to Gisborne, “I think 
one is always in love with something or other.  The error … consists in seeking in a 
mortal image the likeness of what is perhaps eternal” (qtd. in Sperry, 159). 
Love is thus a necessity, and a necessary failure.  No love will ever run on all four 
legs; the “longest journey,” marriage, which even under the best circumstances takes 
place with “a chained friend” (Epipsychidion 158-9), will always be a three-legged race.  
The same applies to poetry, which is never more than an approximation of its “original 
conception,” an inadequate simile, as Shelley explains via a simile in his Defence of 
Poetry: “[T]he mind in creation is as a fading coal which some invisible influence, like an 
inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness….  [W]hen composition begins, 
inspiration is already on the decline, and the most glorious poetry that has ever been 
communicated to the world is probably a feeble shadow of the original conception of the 
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poet” (SPP 531).  Accordingly, Shelley ends the Defence with a flurry of metaphors – 
poets are mirrors, words, trumpets – in a peroration that simultaneously displays the 
author’s imagination and his failure to light upon a single, perfect image. 
 To compile a list of likenesses is the defining device of poetry, according to 
Shelley, even when it is not explicit.  But in Shelley it often is explicit, and nowhere more 
than in the “obtrusive compiling of metaphor” at the beginning of Epipsychidion, where 
love and poetry are both put to the test (Ulmer, “Politics,” 537).14  Thrice the speaker 
attempts, like Satan, to put his conception into words, and thrice he falls short.  The first 
time (lines 25-34) he addresses his beloved “Emily” with a Marian litany of names: 
“Thou Moon beyond the clouds!  Thou living Form / Among the Dead!  Thou Star above 
the Storm! / Thou Wonder, and thou Beauty, and thou Terror!” (27-9).  But he soon 
realizes that these are all “dim words which obscure thee” (33).  Yet he soon tries again, 
this time with a series of tentative metaphors (56-71) reminiscent of those in the Song of 
Songs: “Art thou not … / A well of sealed and secret happiness, / Whose waters like 
blithe light and music are, / Vanquishing dissonance and gloom?  A Star / Which moves 
not in the moving Heavens, alone? / A smile amid dark frowns? a gentle tone / Amid rude 
voices? a beloved light? / A Solitude, a Refuge, a Delight?” (56-64).  Yet here again he 
concedes his own inability to find a sufficient likeness: “I measure / The world of fancies, 
seeking one like thee, / And find – alas! mine own infirmity” (69-71). 
 Yet poetry is dependent upon the continued attempt to find the “one like thee,” 
and the speaker tries once more, this time in a frank series of meta-metaphors (112-129).  
Emily is no longer Eternity, or a dream, or the Moon, but “An image of some bright 
Eternity; / A shadow of some golden dream,” and “a tender / Reflection of the eternal 
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Moon of Love” (115-18, emphasis added).  Finally, she is explicitly “A Metaphor of 
Spring and Youth and Morning” (120).  The metaphor of a metaphor is, like all 
metaphors, insufficient, and the speaker for the third time recognizes his own 
shortcomings, this time in a particularly Miltonic lament: “Ah, woe is me! / What have I 
dared? where am I lifted? how / Shall I descend, and perish not?” (123-5; cf. PL 7.12-20).  
But as Stuart Sperry suggests, this failure may “be seen as integral to the progress of the 
poem” (Sperry, 161). 
 The self-defeating lists of metaphors are integral not only to the poem, but to 
Shelley’s self-definition.  Shelley’s admission that in seeking likenesses he finds only his 
“own infirmity” has a second meaning, though probably not one that he would admit.  Its 
primary significance is that the speaker has discovered anew the impossibility of true 
representation.  But it suggests another “infirmity” more specific to the speaker, his 
chronic infidelity.  His soul “thirsts after its own likeness,” and finds it embodied in 
woman after woman; it is appropriate that he compares Emily to a metaphor, since she 
will be as quickly replaced as the similes in the poem dedicated to her.  Shelley, as I say, 
would not admit that such sexual meandering was an infirmity, since fidelity never held a 
high place in his pantheon of virtues.  In The Revolt of Islam “Faith” is “an obscene 
worm,” and finds itself in bad company – “Fear, Faith, and Slavery” (2168, 3125; 
Poetical Works, 90, 114).  Atheism, according to the title of Shelley’s early pamphlet, is a 
“necessity,” whereas marital fidelity, according to Epipsychidion, is the perverse 
“doctrine” of a “sect”: “Narrow / The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates, / The 
life that wears, the spirit that creates / One object, and one form” (149-50, 169-72).  The 
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refusal to bind oneself to “one object” or “one form” or one likeness lies at the heart of 
Shelley’s most dearly-held moral and poetical beliefs. 
 And yet Shelley’s compulsive search for the perfect simile or the perfect woman, 
in spite of his conviction that such a search is futile, constitutes an act of faith.  “Faith” 
has two quite different senses, only one of which Shelley abjures.  Faith can mean fidelity 
to what one has sworn or what one owes, as in marriage or citizenship.  Alternately, faith 
can indicate belief in what cannot be demonstrated – “believing where we cannot prove.”  
This latter, religious sense is, ironically, a virtue that Shelley greatly admires.  He 
attributes it, for instance, to Milton’s Satan, “who perseveres in [a] purpose which he has 
conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity and torture” (Defence, SPP 526).  Like a 
poet, Satan expresses his faith, in the sense of “constancy to an ideal object,” through his 
perpetual search for something closer to his own conception. 
 It is  not necessary to hold a Shelleyan or Romantic view of Satan’s heroism in 
order to grant that Satan is a true exemplar of “faith” in the second sense of the word.  
Milton calls him the being “Who first broke … Faith, till then / Unbrok’n” (PL 2.690-1); 
but the faith that is demanded of Satan in Milton’s poem bears little resemblance to what 
we usually understand as religious faith.  Satan is not required to believe in a God he 
cannot see or know for certain.  He does need to accept some things on trust: his own 
creation by God, which he cannot remember; the justice of the exaltation of the Son, 
which is dependent upon a belief in God’s perfect love.  But all of these things, as Abdiel 
shows, are logically deducible in the world of heaven and do not require an extraordinary 
or counter-intuitive leap of faith.  Milton’s lists of similes differ from Shelley’s, because 
the two poets are testing different forms of “faith.”  Atheism is not an option for Satan or 
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Adam, nor I think for Milton.  Faith in Paradise Lost is a matter of standing firm, of not 
straying.  It does not involve a quest for an ideal but admittedly unattainable object; the 
search after alternative likenesses is simply unnecessary.  Satan’s futile pursuit of a 
“purpose which he has conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity and torture,” and in 
spite of his knowledge that there is only one true excellence which he can never obtain 
again, is madness in the context of the poem.  But if we introduce the possibility of 
atheism into the world, let alone its necessity, our perception of such a quest necessarily 
changes.  The quest for an approximate ideal becomes admirable, and all the more so for 
Satan’s repressed knowledge of its futility. 
 This same repression is evident in Shelley.  He admits that a mortal will never 
find a lover who will truly embody the ideal he seeks, and that a poet will never be able 
to produce more than a fading image of his original conception.  But faith, in the second 
sense, consists in the pursuit of these ideals nonetheless; if there were no such faith, there 
would be no love or poetry.  There is something psychologically true and perfectly 
ingenuous in Shelley’s shock of discovery of his own failure at the end of each list of 
similes: each time he recognizes the futility of trying to find a perfect likeness, and each 
time he immediately represses this knowledge and goes on in good faith.  This also 
explains the objectionable objection Shelley voices when listing his many lovers: “And 
One was true – oh! why not true to me?”  Hypocritical and perverse though this 
complaint might seem, given that the speaker has just derided monogamy in the most 
unconditional terms, it is true to life.  Shelley is not a faithless polygamist, but a serial 
monogamist; each new woman or metaphor is chosen as “the one” until found to be 
insufficient.  This is the underlying paradox of Epipsychidion, which asserts the 
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impossibility of locating or representing perfection, and then proposes Emily as the sole 
embodiment of perfection (White, 2.268; Sperry, 176). 
 
 Lists of similes in Paradise Lost represent a movement away from perfect 
likeness – each new vehicle weakens similitude, until its fidelity is called into question.  
The same device in Epipsychidion represents the opposite movement, a faithful aspiration 
towards perfection, though always eventually futile.  The device in each poem is a 
microcosm of the whole: in Milton, of paradise lost; in Shelley, of a paradise imagined 
(the Edenic island described in the final part) but never attained, as the prose 
“Advertisement” informs us.  Both these paradigms inform Goblin Market.  Rossetti’s 
poem retells the story of a fall, and its lists of similes, as in Paradise Lost, mark a falling-
off from the tautological neatness of an original state of unity.  But if the girls’ garden in 
Goblin Market resembles Eden, it also calls to mind the island of Epipsychidion, a self-
sufficient space in which two beings can live as one, as Barbara Gelpi has demonstrated 
(Gelpi, 162).  And Rossetti’s lists crucially resemble Shelley’s in their emphasis on the 
necessity of reaching after an ideal. 
 Milton as well as Shelley recognizes the appeal of perpetual questing in the face 
of impossible odds.  Shelley invokes Satan as his model for this mode of sublimity; he 
might also have cited Eve, or Milton himself, who continued to produce pamphlets about 
the establishment of a free commonwealth when the Restoration was already an imminent 
certainty.  Shelley’s quixotic faith, his restless pursuit of the unattainable, should not be 
seen therefore in polar opposition to Milton’s faith, but as a subset of it.  But Christina 
Rossetti’s poetry exemplifies even more starkly than Milton’s the mixture of two 
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different types of faith: an absolute faith in an absolute God, which renders all human 
effort vain at best, and at worst turns it into an obscuring of God’s likeness; and on the 
other hand a faithful striving for perfection.  Both aspects are summed up in her lists of 
similes. 
 Rossetti’s poetic career begins where Milton’s leaves off.  Paradise Regained 
depends upon the notion that all worldly things are vain, or at least “indifferent”; no one 
thing is needful, and anything can be turned into an idol and so efface the divine original.  
This applies even to poetry, which the Son explicitly rejects as unnecessary (PR 4.285-
364), and Milton confirms this rejection by himself rejecting most of the ornaments and 
tropes of his earlier poetry.  Rossetti’s poetry from the first participates in the same 
paradox: it is art which contends that art is ultimately vain, which continually thwarts 
itself or cuts itself off.15  A self-defeating trope such as a list of similes is therefore 
perfectly apt to Rossetti’s purpose, and she deploys it in many of her poems about vanity.  
“Days of Vanity” (1872), for instance, relentlessly piles up images of “life that dieth.”  
Life is compared to a dream, a bubble, a song, a breath, smoke, a flower, a fruit, a bird – 
in all, nineteen comparisons in the first twenty-four lines.  In a section of her volume 
Verses (1893) significantly entitled “The World.  Self-Destruction,” she brings to the fore 
the self-destruction implicit in the listing of similes.  The first poem in the section, “A 
Vain Shadow,” runs as follows: 
The world,—what a world, ah me! 
   Mouldy, worm-eaten, grey: 
Vain as a leaf from a tree, 
   As a fading day, 
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As veriest vanity, 
   As the froth and the spray 
Of the hollow-billowed sea, 
As what was and shall not be, 
   As what is and passes away. 
None of these similes is really memorable in itself; they begin as clichés, move quickly 
into tautology (“Vain … as veriest vanity”), and conclude with utter vagueness.  But their 
collocation saps out even what force they might have had, and the poem stands as a mini-
monument to the vanity of metaphor-making. 
 On the other hand, the poem still stands, and this is the paradox of Rossetti’s 
verse.  All earthly activity, including verse-making, may be “vanity,” but it is also the 
only means to salvation; all earthly activity, including verse-making, is thus a matter of 
life and death.  The effort of compiling self-cancelling metaphors may serve equally well 
as a sign of mortal vanity, or as a sign of devoted effort and so of the potential 
transcendence of mortality.  This comes out most clearly in “Mirrors of Life and Death,” 
a Shelleyan rhapsody in which nineteen of the twenty stanzas begin with “As.”16  But the 
tenor of each of these similes, stated in the first stanza, is dual: “The mystery of Life, the 
mystery / Of Death” (1-2).  The same duality applies to the trope itself: a list of similes 
my be self-extinguishing, or it may, as in Shelley, be absolutely vital.  Hence Rossetti 
returns to it not only in her poems on vanity (e.g. “As froth on the face of the deep”), but 
also in her paeans to saints (“Saints are like roses”) and the Virgin Mary (“Herself a rose, 
who bore the Rose”). 
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 The final lists of similes in Goblin Market declare this duality outright.  Laura 
sucks the juices from Lizzie’s body, and the effect is at first ecstatic. 
Her locks streamed like the torch 
Borne by a racer at full speed, 
Or like the mane of horses in their flight, 
Or like an eagle when she stems the light 
Straight toward the sun, 
Or like a caged thing freed, 
Or like a flying flag when armies run. 
(500-506) 
But almost immediately the fruit has the opposite effect, and from being exalted Laura 
falls into a state of abjection.  Having begun to list, she soon topples completely: 
Sense failed in the mortal strife: 
Like the watch-tower of a town 
Which an earthquake shatters down, 
Like a lightning-stricken mast, 
Like a wind-uprooted tree 
Spun about, 
Like a foam-topped waterspout 
Cast down headlong in the sea, 
She fell at last; 
Pleasure past and anguish past, 
Is it death or is it life? 
Gray 26 
(513-523) 
The answer is both, or as Rossetti puts it, “Life out of death” (524).  Laura’s fall is 
underscored by the use of successive similes, a fallen form of discourse.  The similes 
intervene between “strife” and “life,” so that the justifying rhyme of “life” is only barely 
audible.  And yet life is reborn out of this fall; Lizzie strives to save her sister, subjecting 
herself in the process to a similar barrage of similes (409-421), and emerges with the 
pharmakon, the poison that also serves as antidote.17  The trope is simultaneously 
Miltonic, a sign of degradation and false imitation, and Shelleyan, a sign of faith 
triumphant over apparent futility. 
 Rossetti read and admired Shelley’s poetry – at least the lyrics, if not the 
“impious” longer poems (Gelpi, 151).  One could therefore argue plausibly for the 
influence of such lyrics as “To a Sky-Lark” on the lists of similes in Goblin Market.  But 
the parallel seems to me to be less likely a result of direct influence than of similar 
temperament, predilections which the two poets shared though usually expressed 
differently.  Both Shelley and Rossetti displayed restless dissatisfaction with what this 
world offers and constantly longed for something greater.  In Shelley this led to religious 
and political radicalism and a succession of love affairs; in Rossetti it led to devoted 
Anglo-Catholicism and a habitual aloofness from human contact (Marsh, 101).  But their 
underlying similarity is revealed in the trope that they alone, of major nineteenth-century 
poets, share.18 
 The case of Milton is different.  There is no question that Milton influenced 
Rossetti, and Goblin Market in particular.  Yet Rossetti’s letters and poems are almost 
entirely free of direct allusions to Milton, of the sort that are endemic to Romantic writing 
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(Vejvoda, 561).  But if Milton is not directly alluded to in Goblin Market, neither is God 
– because no such allusion is necessary to establish the religious message of the poem.  
God is always a presence in Rossetti’s poetry, as he is in Milton’s: the similes in 
Paradise Lost, as I have said, always show a consciousness of God as the universal tenor, 
the unstated origin of all likeness.  In Goblin Market Milton too is an undeclared 
presence, the original of which later poetry is a reflection. 
 I do not mean that Milton was Rossetti’s God, or even her god of poetry, but 
simply that in her writing, as more generally in Victorian poetry, he was a benchmark, an 
unspoken standard.  Goblin Market, as many critics have noted, is conscious of its 
belatedness, as is made particularly clear by the character of Jeanie (Laura’s predecessor 
in tasting goblin fruit; not only is Laura’s “sin” not Original, it is not even original).  And 
yet this sense of coming later does not necessarily imply an agonistic relationship to the 
predecessor, as Kathleen Vejvoda has ably argued (concentrating on the inspiration 
Rossetti drew from Comus).  Rossetti’s poetic relationship to Milton is one that was 
unavailable to Percy Shelley.  Shelley’s invocations of Milton imply either a defiant 
transcendence or an anxious defeat, both represented by his lists of similes.  Where 
Shelley seeks to override and over-write Milton, Milton simply underwrites Rossetti.  
This does not mean that her relationship to Milton is not tense, complex, sometimes even 
combative; but the Victorian poet accepts Milton’s invisible and constant presence as a 
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1 Lines 5-7, 188-90, in Christina Rossetti, The Complete 
Poems, ed. Crump and Flowers; all quotations from Rossetti 
refer to this edition. 
2 For an excellent overview of lists in prose and verse, see 
Belknap, “The Literary List,” and for a comprehensive 
treatment of a great classical lister, see Carey, Pliny’s 
Catalogue of Culture. 
3 Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Reiman and Fraistat, p. 
515.  All further reference to Shelley’s work are to this 
edition (abbreviated SPP) unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Miriam Sagan, commenting on the string of similes 
describing Lizzie (ll. 408-21), claims that “All of the 
metaphors build on each other, there are daring visual 
leaps, but the sense is never lost” (Sagan, 72).  Sean C. 
Grass likewise reads a list of similes (the one I have just 
quoted above) as if each image were perfectly distinct 
(Grass, 366), although elsewhere his article emphasizes the 
perils of profusion. 
5 Modern literary criticism of metaphor begins with I. A. 
Richards, who introduced the terms “tenor” and “vehicle” – 
which I retain, despite their inadequacies, for what 
Richards called their “immense convenience”; see The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 96.  Moreover, most of the 
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difficulties with tenor and vehicle concern metaphor; their 
use in relation to simile, which is my main interest, is 
less problematic.  For debate about the nature of metaphor, 
see Terence Hawkes, Metaphor; the special issues of New 
Literary History (Autumn, 1974) and Critical Inquiry 
(Autumn, 1978); and on the futility of further debate, 
Christopher Ricks, “The Pursuit of Metaphor.”  On the epic 
simile in particular, see Stephen A. Nimis, Narrative 
Semiotics in the Epic Tradition: The Simile, which 
stretches from Homer to Milton. 
6 “True, we can switch from one reading to another with 
increasing rapidity; we will also ‘remember’ the rabbit 
while we see the duck, but the more closely we watch 
ourselves, the more certainly we will discover that we 
cannot experience alternative readings at the same time” 
(Gombrich, 5).  Again, although a simile does not require 
that we actually visualize its elements, nevertheless the 
act of imagining a crowd of warriors who resemble both 
water and wheat is a more complex piece of doublethink than 
we usually recognize. 
7 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. G. R. Hibbard (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3.2.358-64. 
8 The list of similes in Goblin Market describing Lizzie 
(408-421) purposely recalls the Marian liturgy: Lizzie is 
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“white and golden,” “Like a lily” or “a royal virgin” 
(Grass, 367).  She is also compared to “a blue-veined 
stone,” which is reminiscent of the Madonna mentioned in 
Robert Browning’s “The Bishop Orders his Tomb,” line 44. 
9 The chief Virgilian precedent for Milton’s catalogue of 
devils, however, is not this relatively brief instance in 
Book VII of the Aeneid, but rather Anchises’s naming of 
Roman luminaries in Book VI, which takes place in the 
underworld and which is, like Milton’s, proleptic: these 
are not yet their names. 
10 See Leonard, Naming in Paradise, 67-85, especially 67-9, 
76.  All quotations from Milton refer to The Riverside 
Milton, ed. Roy Flannagan. 
11 Rosenblatt argues that the entire catalogue is one of 
sinful association, that the primary threat in the poem is 
less one of enmity than of “cursed union and contamination” 
(555); not difference, but false similitude. 
12 The opening sentence of Book I includes “mortal,” 
“Restore,” “Oreb,” “more,” “oracle,” and “soar.”  On the 
conjunction “or” as the sign of choice, see Brisman, 12-25 
and passim. 
13 Fish invokes the Leviathan simile as an analogue for the 
deceptive temptations of the poem as a whole, not just its 
metaphors (Fish, 36, 71).  Elsewhere, however, he describes 
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how “ambiguity and metaphor are the enemies because they 
are the basis of all distortion” (128; see also 122-3). 
14 Ulmer goes on to suggest that “all failures of desire 
present themselves as representational failures confessing 
to the limits of language” (541).  Similarly, J. Hillis 
Miller points out that Shelley in this poem “expresses … 
the failure of poetry and the failure of love” (Miller, 
243). 
15 I discuss the self-censoring of Milton and of Rossetti in 
the introduction and epilogue, respectively, of The Poetry 
of Indifference. 
16 For an excellent recent reading of this poem’s dualities, 
see Armstrong, 34-9. 
17 Rossetti’s figure serves as a particularly clear 
illustration of this term as it is presented in Derrida, 
Dissemination, 95-100. 
18 Or almost alone: Blake lists similes near the beginning 
of The Book of Thel, as does Byron in Don Juan, canto 1, 
stanza 55, and other local instances probably abound.  More 
notably, the layering thick of epic similes is a salient 
feature of Swinburne’s verse; on this topic see Tucker, 
especially pp. 76-82.  Yet Shelley and Rossetti remain 
unusual in their habitual use of rapid, anaphoric lists of 
similes. 
